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Abstract
This paper investigates economic growth under liquidity constraints by tak-
ing into account the choices of fertility, human capital and saving. In a
model of four overlapping generations, parents are altruistic towards their
o¤spring and nance their education investment. The government provides
education subsidies to young adult parents and levies taxes on income of the
adult generation. Sensitivity analysis on borrowing limits and tax paramet-
ers highlights e¤ects with opposite sign on the main endogenous variables
at steady state. A lift in liquidity constraints decreases savings and capital
accumulation and this e¤ect is responsible for the ambiguous sign of compar-
ative statics on the rate of fertility and on human capital investment. From
model simulation, we derive an inverted U-shaped curve relating the borrow-
ing limit with fertility, education and growth, meaning that nancial reforms
in the less developed countries have positive e¤ects on the economy in the
long-run, even if they raise fertility and reduce savings. Greater government
subsidies to human capital investments and lower income taxes have positive
e¤ects on savings and fertility. The same parameters present ambiguous ef-
fects on education investments and growth. Numerical simulations show that
a) human capital investment has an inverted U-shaped relation with income
taxes and education subsidies ; b) economic growth decreases with greater
income taxes and increases with higher education subsidies.
Jel codes: O40, O16, J13, D91.
1 Introduction
The family has a central role in the modern theory of economic growth and
development that considers human capital accumulation as the engine of eco-
nomic dynamics in the long term (e.g., Becker, Murphy and Tamura, 1990;
Galor and Weil, 1996). In this strand of the literature, recent research has
investigated the consequences of limited access of households to the credit
market on aggregate economic outcomes. In this paper we study the e¤ects of
borrowing constraints on economic growth by taking into account all the ma-
jor decisions of households: fertility, child education and savings. Although
the importance of the connections among these sides of household beha-
vior is clear in the microeconomics of the family(e.g., Becker, 1991; Cigno,
1991; Schultz, 1997), the existing literature on economic growth still lacks a
comprehensive study of the issue in economic environments characterized by
credit market imperfections. In this analysis we also consider an even more
neglected issue in growth models: family taxation with endogenous fertil-
ity, which is an important feature of modern economic systems since several
forms of market failure have pervasive e¤ects on household behavior.
The existing literature analyzes particular aspects of household choices
under borrowing constraints. The seminal article by Jappelli and Pagano
(1994) highlights the consequences of liquidity constraints on saving and
growth. If household expenditure on consumption is limited, then savings are
greater and capital accumulation is stronger, and this e¤ect can cause higher
economic growth. De Gregorio (1996) shifts the focus on family behavior
from savings to investment in human capital. Young individuals who attend
school face an opportunity cost given by forgone earnings. If they cannot
fully nance this cost by borrowing on the credit market, then they will
reach a lower level of human capital, which can be detrimental to economic
growth. De Gregorio and Kim (2000) and Azariadis and de la Croix (2006)
extend this approach to analyze the evolution of income distribution and
growth in economies with imperfect capital markets. All these papers assume
exogenously given liquidity constraints, while some recent interesting research
(Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2002; Andolfatto and Gervais, 2006; Papagni,
2006; de la Croix and Michel, 2007) follows the approach of Kehoe and Levine
(1993)1 to endogenize borrowing limits in life-cycle models of human capital
investment. It must be noted that only Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, (2002),
and Azariadis and de la Croix (2006) study the joint dynamics of physical
and human capital relying on numerical simulations, while only in Papagni
(2006) is fertility choice endogenous in a model of a small-open economy2.
1See also Azariadis and Lambertini, 2003.
2A di¤erent but important strand of the literature analyzes the e¤ects of social security
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In this paper, our aim is to study how liquidity constraints inuence
steady-state economic growth through the interactive e¤ects they have on
the most important decisions of parents: number of children, their level of
education, consumption and savings. In order to preserve a comprehensive
approach to family decisions, we retain from the literature the assumption
of exogenous borrowing limits.
Intergenerational linkages and borrowing/lending household behavior are
clearly specied in a model of four overlapping generations. Agents acquire
human capital when young, then work and have children in the rst age of
adulthood. In this period, they can choose to rely on the credit market to
nance consumption and expenditure on child education. However, parents
face a limit to borrowing which could ration their current expenditures. In
the next age, children leave the family and adult workers save to preserve
their future well-being under retirement. Imperfections in the credit market
justify government intervention which consists in subsidies to child educa-
tion expenditure nanced by at-rate taxes on labor income of the second
generation of adults who are free from child support.
The model owns a unique stationary equilibrium. Numerical simulations
show that the steady state has the stability properties of a local saddle point.
Sensitivity analysis on borrowing limits and tax parameters highlight e¤ects
with opposite sign on the main endogenous variables at steady state. A
lift in liquidity constraints decreases savings and capital accumulation as in
Jappelli and Pagano (1994),3and this e¤ect is responsible for the ambiguous
sign of comparative statics on the rate of fertility and on human capital
investment. From model simulation, we derive an inverted U-shaped curve
relating the borrowing limit with fertility, education and growth, meaning
that nancial reforms in the less developed countries have positive e¤ects on
the economy in the long-run, even if they raise fertility and reduce savings.
The same reform in countries with signicant nancial development could be
ine¤ective or detrimental to economic growth. These results seem conrmed
by econometric analyses. Indeed, at the micro level, Pitt et al. (1999) nd
that female and male participation to microcredit programs in Bangladesh
increases fertility, which is consistent with the shape of the curve relating the
credit limit with fertility at low levels of nancial development. A similar
non-monotonicity of the function of the growth rate seems conrmed by
on fertility and growth (e.g., Boldrin, et al., 2005; Ehrlich and Kim, 2007). The rst paper
also considers the degree of nancial market development. Indeed, it shows that when
households can access to better nancial instruments for saving fertility is lower because
they can rely less on their childrens aid in the old age.
3This e¤ect is conrmed by econometric analyses of Jappelli and Pagano (1994) and
Loayza et al. (2000).
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studies based on aggregate data. Indeed, Jappelli and Pagano (1994) and De
Gregorio (1996) nd some evidence of a positive relation between liquidity
constraints and growth in estimates on data from OECD countries, while De
Gregorios (1996) estimates show a negative relation when the sample refers
to developing countries.
According to comparative statics of steady-state equilibrium, greater gov-
ernment subsidies to human capital investments and lower income taxes have
positive e¤ects on savings and fertility. The same parameters present am-
biguous e¤ects on education investments and growth. In fact, in this model
there are several channels through which parameters inuence the endogen-
ous variables often in opposite directions. Numerical simulations resolve this
sign indeterminacy since they show that a) human capital investment has
an inverted U-shaped relation with income taxes and education subsidies ;
b) economic growth decreases with greater income taxes and increases with
higher education subsidies. Most of these comparative-statics e¤ects are new
for the literature on economic growth with endogenous fertility, where the
only similar papers are Zhang and Casagrande (1998) who nd that the fer-
tility rate does not depend on scal policy parameters4, and Papagni (2006)
where in a model of multiple equilibria, the e¤ects of scal policy depend on
the level of steady-state fertility rate.
The whole set of results of this paper represents a contribution to the
analysis of the ways credit market imperfections and public policy a¤ect
household behavior and economic growth in the long run. They provide
some insights into the channels through which these phenomena interact,
which emerge from a comprehensive account of intergenerational relations
among members of the family and those expressed by the state.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an OLG
model of economic growth. Section 3 derives general equilibrium and char-
acterizes the dynamic properties of the steady state. Section 4 presents the
results of sensitivity analysis of steady state variables with respect to para-
meters proxy of credit availability and scal policy. Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2 The Model
We put forward an overlapping-generations model of economic growth with
endogenous fertility. The economy is populated by identical individuals
4An interesting reference is Jappelli and Pagano (1999) which deals with scal policy
in a model of liquidity constraints and growth. Boldrin et al. (2005) and Ehrich and Kim
(2007) investigate the e¤ects of social security policy on fertility and economic growth.
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whose life is summarized in four periods, such that they are young in the
rst, young adult in the second, adult in the third and old in the fourth.
Agents attend school when young, work and take care of children during the
rst period of adulthood, work and save when adult, and retire and consume
saving returns when they are old. The credit market is a¤ected by imper-
fections which bring about constraints to the household borrowing ability.
Young agents do not work, nor have access to the nancial market and edu-
cation costs are borne by their altruistic parents. The economy produces
one homogeneous good and is closed to international markets. A crucial
assumption is that individuals are endowed with perfect foresight.
2.1 Technology
Time is discrete and is denoted by t = 0; 1; 2; :::::1. The labor force is made
by population of the two adult generations. We denote with Nt  N t 1t the
number of young adults born in time t  1 and living in period t, such that
nt =
Ntt+1
Nt 1t
represents the number of children born of a young adult at time
t. Every adult is endowed with human capital et that she acquired during
childhood by attending school. This is a productive process which requires
resources in terms of goods and services that must be drawn from other
uses. Teachers, books and other inputs (television, journals, travels, etc.)
can be considered within a general denition of learning technology. Here,
we specify a simple human capital production function:
et = bt , (1)
where  is the level of learning technology, and bt stands for the amount of re-
sources employed in the learning process. Human capital does not depreciate
and can be used in production during two generations of agent life.
A single homogeneous good, Y , is produced in the economy according to
a production function with constant returns to scale with respect to capital,
Kt, and labor, Lt, inputs:
Yt = AK

t L
1 
t ,  2 (0; 1) ,
where A denotes the exogenous level of technology. Labor input L is made
by raw labor and e¢ ciency units supplied each time by two generations of
adults: Lt = Ntet +Nt 1et 1. As usual, we express the production function
per unit of e¤ective labor terms as:
yt = Ak

t , (2)
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where yt = YtLt , and kt =
Kt
Lt
.
The sector of good production is competitive as are the markets for factors
of production. Accordingly, prot maximization and market equilibrium im-
ply that wage per e¢ ciency unit of labor, wt, equals marginal productivity:
wt = A (1  ) kt , (3)
and the rental rate of capital, Rt, equals capital marginal productivity:
Rt = Ak
 1
t . (4)
2.2 Household preferences and budget constraints
The family is composed by a single parent and by children that she has in
the second period of her life. The rst generation of individuals is concerned
mainly with schooling. Children do not work and their consumption and
expenditure on education - both included in bt - derive from the income
of their young parents. Indeed, we distinguish adulthood into two periods
according to the kind of relationship between children and parents. During
the rst period adults have children and take care of them until they reach
the age which allows them to work and be self-su¢ cient. After this stage of
adult life, children leave their parentshouse and intergenerational linkages
in the family disappear5.
To simplify the analysis we assume that childhood is a dummy generation
meaning that consumption is an input of education and does not provide any
utility to children. Furthermore, children do not have resources and cannot
borrow to nance human capital investment, hence this decision is made
by their altruistic parents6. Adults decide consumption over their life-cycle,
number and human capital of children, saving and debt with the aim of
intertemporal utility maximization. Taking the point of view of a young
adult, we denote with Ci;t+i  Ct 1i;t+i, i = 0; 1; 2; consumption of an agent
born at time t 1, where i is the age of her life varying from young adulthood
to old age.
Parents appreciate the presence of children in the family and spend part
of their earnings to rear them. Altruism in the family also motivates the
preference of the parents for well-educated children. The intertemporal utility
5We do not deal with bequest, because we concentrate on the e¤ects of liquidity con-
straints on inter vivos transfers which according to the empirical literaure (e.g., Cox and
Jappelli, 1990) dominate bequest.
6These assumptions over child and parent behavior have been made in several papers,
e.g., de la Croix and Doepke, (2004)
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at period t of an adult born at time t  1 is represented by the function
V (C0;t; C1;t+1; C2;t+2; et+1; nt) =
log(C0;t) +  log(C1;t+1) + 
2 log(C2;t+2) + ' log (et+1) + U (nt) ;
where  2 (0; 1) is a discount factor, ' > 0 measures the importance of
childrens education in the preferences of a young adult, et+1 denotes human
capital of children born at time t which will be adult in the next period, and
U (nt) is a continuous function of fertility satisfying the assumptions:
Un (nt) > 0; Unn (nt) < 0; lim
n!0
Un (nt) =1; lim
n!1
Un (nt) = 0:
In this economic environment adults make all decisions. During the rst
period of adulthood households enjoy consumption and take care of children.
Raising children is an expensive activity and we assume parents spend a share
 2 (0; 1) of their labor income on child rearing with a cost of ntwtet. Young
adults can increase their resources by borrowing on imperfect credit markets,
or could save to increase consumption during the next ages. In the case of
a loan lower than the maximum amount allowed by the credit system (i.e.,
unconstrained borrowing), young adults face the following budget constraint:
C0;t + ntwtet + (1  v)ntbt+1 = wtet +Dt, (5)
where Dt denotes borrowed resources, and v 2 (0; 1) is the share of childrens
education costs that is subsidized by the government. Note that Dt can also
be negative in the case of households choosing to save for the future. After
the rst period of adulthood, children leave the family and parents become
worried about their welfare in the years in which they will have retired.
Hence, adults repay debts Dt previously incurred (or enjoy saving returns if
Dt < 0), consume and save part of their remaining income for consumption
in old age. Their choices are consistent with the following budget constraint:
C1;t+1 +Rt+1Dt + St+1 = (1  tw)wt+1et, (6)
where St+1 denotes saving of an adult born in period t   1, and tw 2 (0; 1)
denotes a tax rate on adult income7. In old age individuals retire and cannot
borrow since nobody will repay their loan. Hence they nance consumption
with the returns from saving in the previous age:
C2;t+2 = Rt+2St+1. (7)
7Here we are assuming that wages of adults are subject to taxes while those of young
adults are not. This is a simplifying assumption that can be easily analytically justied
by considering that young adults are the recipients of education subsidies.
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The life-cycle present value budget constraint derives from single-period
budget constraints eqs. (5)-(7):
C0;t+
C1;t+1
Rt+1
+
C2;t+2
Rt+2
+ntwtet+(1  v)ntbt+1 = wtet+ (1  tw)wt+1et
Rt+1
. (8)
More realistically, households are not allowed to borrow any amount of
resources consistent with their life-cycle income because the credit market is
a¤ected by important imperfections. A recent literature has endogenized li-
quidity constraints in life-cycle models (e.g., Azariadis and Lambertini, 2003)
following the framework of Kehoe and Levine (1993) where agents who de-
fault on a loan contract cannot borrow in the future, and credit is allowed
only to those who have the incentive to repay their debt. Several applications
of this approach concern the nance of human capital investment in mod-
els of dynamic general equilibrium under some simplifying hypotheses (e.g.,
Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2002; Andolfatto and Gervais, 2006; Papagni,
2006; de la Croix and Michel, 2007). All these paper but Papagni (2006) con-
sider fertility exogenous, while Andolfatto and Gervais (2006) and Papagni
(2006) make the assumption of a small open economy which implies exogen-
ous capital accumulation. While, endogenizing liquidity constraint makes
an important contribution to the analysis of household behavior in the life-
cycle general equilibrium model, assumptions which neglect the number of
children in household decision-making deny the possibility that parents who
face liquidity constraints modify their choices with respect to the number of
children. Indeed, constrained households could either reduce the quantity
and quality of their children or could have fewer children but invest more in
their human capital. The aggregate consequences of these alternatives can
di¤er signicantly.
To take account in the model of all the major dimensions of household
decisions in the life cycle, we assume exogenous credit constraints as do
Jappelli and Pagano (1994), Buiter and Kletzer (1995) and De Gregorio
(1996) amongst others. In particular, we assume that the borrowing limit Dt
is dened implicitly by the following rule:
wtet +Dt = 	

wtet +
(1  tw)wt+1et
Rt+1

; (9)
Equation (9) establishes that for any value of the given parameter 	 there
is a specic amount of credit limit Dt . 	 can be thought of as the share
of life cycle income available to young adults in each period. It is a positive
constant that assumes its minimum value, 	, at:
7
wtet = 	

wtet +
(1  tw)wt+1et
Rt+1

;
in which case households cannot borrow: Dt = 0. The opposite case is that
of unconstrained access to the credit market which occurs when 	 assumes
its maximum value: 	 = 1, and Dt =
(1 tw)wt+1et
Rt+1
. Accordingly, when the
parameter 	 assumes values lower than one, households are constrained in
their borrowing ability if the ratio of current expenditure on consumption
and children to the present value life-cycle income is greater than 	, which
means Dt > Dt and young adults cannot nance their desired expenditure:
C0;t + ntwtet + (1  v)ntbt+1  	

wtet +
(1  tw)wt+1et
Rt+1

. (10)
2.3 Optimization
In the rst period of life individuals accomplish plans made by their parents.
In the next age, households become adult and make programs over the main
aspects of their life. Hence, at period t a young adult chooses consumption of
the remaining three periods of life, how many children she will have and their
level of education according to the following utility maximization problem:
max
C0;t;C1;t+1;C2;t+2;et+1;nt
V (C0;t; C1;t+1; C2;t+2; et+1; nt)
subject to
C0;t +
C1;t+1
Rt+1
+ C2;t+2
Rt+2
+ ntwtet + (1  v)ntbt+1 = wtet + (1 tw)wt+1etRt+1 ;
C0;t + ntwtet + (1  v)ntbt+1  	
h
wtet +
(1 tw)wt+1et
Rt+1
i
.
To solve this problem we specify a Lagrangian function in which t denotes
the multiplier associated with the intertemporal budget constraint eq. (8)
and t is the multiplier of the borrowing constraint, eq. (10). The following
assumptions on the utility function
 A1:  Unn (nt)n2t > '; 8nt 2 R+;
 A2: Unn (nt)nt + Un (nt) > 0, 8nt 2 R+ ;
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ensure: a) the utility maximization problem is convex8; b) the young adult
chooses a non-negative number of children; c) a trade-o¤between quality and
quantity of children in parentsdecisions. Hence, the rst order conditions:
1
C0;t
  (t + t) = 0;

C1;t+1
  t
Rt+1
= 0;
2
C2;t+2
  t
Rt+1Rt+2
= 0;
'
bt+1
  (t + t) (1  v)nt = 0;
Un (nt)  (t + t) [(1  v) bt+1 + wtet] = 0:
(11)
are su¢ cient for a maximum. In the case of non-binding liquidity constraints,
the young adult household would choose consumption and children expendit-
ure as:
C0;t + ntwtet + (1  v)ntbt+1 = 
(nt)

wtet +
(1  tw)wt+1et
Rt+1

,
where

 (nt)  Un (nt)nt + 1
1 +  + 2 + Un (nt)nt
:
Accordingly, liquidity constraints are binding if 	 < 
, in which case the
household cannot borrow the amount that would maximize her utility. In
the following, we will maintain this hypothesis for any period t.
Concerning conditions (), the rst three refer to consumption choice and
have straight interpretation. The saving rate of an adult of the generation
t  1 can be derived from the f. o. c.
St+1 =
2 (1 	)Rt+1
 + 2

wtet +
(1  tw)wt+1et
Rt+1

. (12)
Hence, adult saving is a function of the life cycle income and increases with
the tightness of liquidity constraint (see Jappelli and Pagano, 1994).
8Indeed, the quantity-quality of children trade-o¤ is known to introduce non-convexity
into household optimization problems. If we rewrite the utility maximization problem
dening the new variable qt+1 = ntbt+1 and replacing bt+1 with
qt+1
nt
then we get a new
problem that under A1-A2 is convex (see also Willis, 1973).
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The fourth condition refers to the decision of the parent on investment
in childrens education, and equates marginal utility of higher education to
the marginal cost which is clearly dependent on the number of children to
be educated. After manipulation of equations (11) we get the following rule
for child investment:
bt+1 =
'	
(1  v)nt (Un (nt)nt + 1)

wtet +
(1  tw)wt+1et
Rt+1

, (13)
which states that parents spend on their childrens education a fraction of
their life-time income which depends positively on credit availability, 	, and
negatively on fertility.
The last of the rst order conditions derives from the parents choice of
fertility, and equates the marginal increase in utility of one more child to its
marginal cost which is made by two components: child rearing and education.
Even in the case of fertility the solution of the households decision problem
provides us with the following rule that implicitly describes the factors behind
choosing the number of children:
nt (Un (nt)nt + 1)
(Un (nt)nt   ') =
	


1 +
(1  tw)wt+1
wtRt+1

. (14)
It can be easy to verify that under assumptions A1-A2 the left side of equation
(14) increases with nt, and this e¤ect implies that parents have more children
if their resources are higher, if child cost is lower, and if they appreciate less
child education (lower ').
2.4 Intergenerational scal policy
Household liquidity constraints are market imperfections that justify state
intervention. Here, we do not deal with all kinds of intergenerational scal
policies, nor with their optimal design. Instead, we focus on intergenerational
transfers which can, at least in part, release families from limited access
to the credit market. According to this policy, the government supports
families with children by subsidizing their expenditure on child education
in a proportion given by v. This public expenditure is nanced with at-
rate taxes on wages of the next generation of adults who are free from chid
support. The government balances its budget in each period, which implies:
vntbt+1Nt = twwtet 1Nt 1,
where the left side represents public expenditure on subsidies received at time
t by the young adult generation which has nt children per capita, while the
10
right side is the amount of resources collected by the state at time t as taxes
on the wages of adults born at time t 2. The government budget constraint
can also be written as:
vntbt+1 =
twwtet 1
nt 1
, (15)
and in this form it highlights the dynamic interactions between fertility and
education implied by public policy: lower past fertility and higher adult
education allow greater subsidization of education investment of the present
generation.
3 Equilibrium
The previous section dealt with optimal decisions of households and rms.
The goods market clears when production equals the demand for consump-
tion and investment in human and physical capital; factor markets also clear
when each factor price equals marginal productivity. In the market for
loans households face a limit to borrowing which implies market rationing.
Firms need resources to nance their investment and the supply of capital is
provided by savings of households. We assume that capital depreciates fully
in one period, hence the capital market-clearing condition is
Kt+1 =  DtNt + StNt 1,
according to which the supply of savings comes from adult savings net of
young adult debts. This condition can be written more conveniently as
kt+1 (ntet+1 + et) =  Dt + St
nt 1
. (16)
Substitution of optimal individual policies for debt and saving in this equa-
tion gives the equilibrium rule for capital accumulation:
kt+1 (ntet+1 + et) = wtet  	

wtet +
(1  tw)wt+1et
Rt+1

+
+
2 (1 	)Rt 
 + 2

nt 1

wt 1et 1 +
(1  tw)wtet 1
Rt

.
The last equation completes the description of the components of the
model economy. The equilibrium is characterized by the clearing of product
markets, factor markets, and nancial markets in which credit to households
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is rationed. In equilibrium human capital accumulation follows from the op-
timal decisions of young parents subject to a credit constraint which is in
part relaxed by the intervention of the government whose budget constraint
is balanced in every period. Starting from historical values of state variables
(N0; e0; n0, k0; k1), the evolution of the economy derives from optimal fer-
tility behavior, human and physical capital accumulations, equations (1),
(13), (14), and (16).
In order to simplify the analysis, we dene two new variables. As in de
la Croix and Michel (2002), we set:
xt  wt+1
wtRt+1
; (17)
which has the meaning of a growth factor of the discounted life-cycle wage.
In this way, the life-cycle income becomes:
wtet +
(1  tw)wt+1et
Rt+1

= wtet [1 + (1  tw)xt] .
The second new variable is:
jt  '	 [1 + (1  tw)xt]
(1  v) (Un (nt)nt + 1) , (18)
which can be substituted in equation (13) to give:
ntbt+1 = jtwtet.
Hence, jt can be thought of as the proportionality factor which explains the
educational expenditure of each young parent in terms of her present income.
jt increases with the wage growth factor, xt; and decreases with the fertility
rate.
With these new variables we restate the equations describing economic
equilibrium. First, let us consider the optimal expenditure in education, eq.
(13). From substitution of equations (14), (18), and et = bt in equation
(13) we get the gross rate of growth of human capital t:
t 
et+1
et
=
wtjt
	 [1 + (1  tw)xt] : (19)
Then, substitution of (17) in (14) provides the relation between fertility rate
nt and xt:
nt (Un (nt)nt + 1)
(Un (nt)nt   ') =
	

[1 + (1  tw)xt] : (20)
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Since individual optimal decisions must be consistent with the government
budget constraint, we plug equations (13), (18) into equation (15) and obtain
the rst-order di¤erence equation:
jt =
tw
vwt 1jt 1
  (wt 1; jt 1) : (21)
The Cobb-Douglas technology allows the derivation of the following dynamic
relation between w and x:
wt = A
 (1  )1 wt 1xt 1  ! (wt 1; xt 1) . (22)
The dynamics of physical capital can be reformulated in terms of the variable
xt as follows:
kt+1

nt
et+1
et
+ 1

= wt  	wt [1 + (1  tw)xt] + (23)
+
2 (1 	)Rtwt 1et 1 
 + 2

nt 1et
[1 + (1  tw)xt 1] .
After substitution in equation (23) of equations (19), (21), (22) and the
following relations
kt+1 =

1  xtwt;
Rtwt 1 = xt 1wt;
- derived from equations (2) and (3) and from the denition of xt - the
di¤erence equation of kt becomes a rst-order di¤erence equation in xt :
xt =
(1 	) (1  )wt 1xt 1jt 1 + 
2(1 	)(1 )A
(+2)
[1 + (1  tw)xt]
[+	(1  ) (1  tw)]wt 1xt 1jt 1 + Atw1+(1 )
1 
v
wt 1x
1+
t 1
(24)
  (wt 1; xt 1; jt 1) .
3.1 The dynamic system
The intertemporal equilibrium is characterized by capital accumulation, hu-
man capital investment and reproductive behavior of the population. It can
be analyzed in terms of the derived variables xt, wt, jt.
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Denition 1 A dynamic equilibrium of the economy is a sequence fxt; wt; jtg1t=0
that satises the dynamical system8>>>><>>>>:
xt =  (xt 1; wt 1; jt 1) :
wt = ! (xt 1; wt 1)
jt =  (wt 1; jt 1) ,
(25)
where (N0; e0; n0, k0; k1) are exogenously given.
Denition 2 A steady-state equilibrium of the economy is a triple
nbx; bw;bjo
such that: 8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
bx = bx; bw;bj :
bw = ! (bx; bw)
bj = bw;bj .
(26)
Accordingly, the model implies that in a steady-state equilibrium the
capital-labor ratio kt = bk remains constant as well as the rate of growth of
population nt = bn, and the rate of growth of human capital t = b. Hence,
when the economy reaches a stationary equilibrium the variables in level, Yt,
Kt, Lt, grow at the constant rate bg = bnb   1. The existence and uniqueness
of a steady-state equilibrium for the overlapping generations economy is the
argument of the following proposition:
Proposition 1 A steady-state equilibrium
nbx; bw;bjo of the dynamical system
(25) exists and is unique.
Proof. In appendix.
To study the local stability of the steady state
nbx; bw;bjo we consider the
linear approximation of the dynamical system (25) in the neighborhood of the
steady state. The relative Jacobian matrix evaluated in the point
nbx; bw;bjo
provides information on the local stability of the steady state. Given the
complexity of the analytical expressions for the eigenvalues of the Jacobian,
we rely on a numerical simulation. As in Azariadis, Bullard and Ohanian,
(2001), we calculate the steady state
nbx; bw;bjo and the relative eigenvalues by
drawing randomly the values of the parameters f, ', , v,  , tw, 	g from
uniform distributions. More precisely, we assume that each parameter takes
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values in a given range:  2 (0:5; 2); ' 2 (0:5; 2);  2 (0:25; 0:5); v 2
(0:05; 0:3);  2 (0:05; 0:2); tw 2 (0:05; 0:4); 	 2 (0:2; 1). We also set the
parameters A and , which dene the scale of good production and that of
human capital accumulation, to a constant value: A = 1,  = 1.
From the random selection of 100 numerical congurations of the para-
meters we obtain values of the steady state
nbx; bw;bjo and the eigenvalues
fx; w, jgfor each parameter conguration. The results are summarized in
Figure 1. Two features characterize these simulations: rst, two eigenvalues
have modulus smaller than one, while the other eigenvalue is greater than
one in all but four cases; second, the stable eigenvalues are equal. Note that
initial conditions (N0; e0; n0, k0; k1) imply the following historical values:
x0 = k1=Ak

0 , w0 = A (1  ) k0 , and j0 = '	[1+(1 tw)x0](1 v)[Un(n0)n0+1] . Accordingly, all
but four of the economies dened in these numerical simulations present a
steady state which has the local stability properties of a saddle point, while
the remaining four show asymptotically stable dynamics in the neighborhood
of steady states. Repeated eigenvalues have modulus smaller than one and
value in many cases positive but in some cases negative, hence convergence
of the system to the steady state is not monotone (Galor, 2007).
4 E¤ects of liquidity constraints and taxation
The local stability properties of the dynamical system allow analysis of the
stationary equilibrium displacement after changes in credit availability and
scal policy. Since our interest focuses on fundamental variables of the model,
namely fertility rate, human capital accumulation, saving and growth rate,
we rewrite the steady-state system (26) in terms of the variables bn and bk and
obtain (see appendix) the following equations:
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Un (bn) bn = 	'
1  v
s
(1  ) vA
tw

1 +
(1  tw)
A
bk1 bk 2   1,(27)
b = 	'
1  v

A (1  )bk + (1  tw) 1  bk
[Un (bn) bn+ 1] bn , (28)
bg + 1 = 	'
1  v

A (1  )bk + (1  tw) 1  bk
[Un (bn) bn+ 1] , (29)

bk  B1bk1  +B2bk1 2  B3 hbk 2 1 + (1  tw)bk 2 i+
  (1 	) (1  ) = 0; (30)
where B1, B2, B3 are the following functions of parameters:
B1  +	(1  ) (1  tw)
A
;
B2  (1  )
1
2 
3
2
r
tw
Av
;
B3  
2 (1 	)pv (1  )A 
 + 2


3
2
p
tw
:
The rst equation explains the rate of fertility and shows how the pos-
itive e¤ect of bk on bn passes through life-cycle income. The second refers to
the rate of human capital accumulation which shows a positive dependence
of b on the capital to labor ratio and a negative relation with the rate of
fertility. A similar shape has the third equation of the gross rate of growth
of aggregate income. The last implicit equation derives from the equilibrium
in the capital market and takes account of all the inuences of the other
endogenous variables on bk.
The four equations (27)-(30) fully describe the model economy at the
steady-state equilibrium and can be used to study the e¤ects of both greater
credit availability, and changes of education subsidies and income taxes on
fertility, rate of human capital accumulation, saving and economic growth.
Relaxing borrowing constraints
Liquidity constraints have a pervasive inuence on the endogenous vari-
ables of the model: lifting borrowing constraints (increasing 	) provides
young adults with greater resources for consumption and investment in chil-
dren, with direct partial e¤ects on households choices. However, the full
e¤ect depends on how bn and bk change. As far as physical capital is con-
cerned we prove the following:
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Proposition 2 The steady-state capital to labor ratio bk increases with a
tightening of liquidity constraints (lower 	).
Proof. Applying the implicit function theorem to (30) we get:
dbk
d	
=
 	
bk;	
bk
bk;	 .
Since B1, B2, B3 are positive constants, bk
bk;	 > 0 easily follows. A brief
inspection of (30) is enough to verify that 	
bk;	 > 0, which completes
the proof of the proposition.
Proposition (2) conrms a well-known comparative statics result obtained
by Jappelli and Pagano (1994). Actually, in our model the number of children
and their education enter the utility function of the parents as their consump-
tion does. Hence, young adults, facing tighter access to credit, reduce their
debts and increase resources for capital accumulation. De Gregorio (1996)
derives an ambiguous e¤ect of borrowing constraints on savings in a di¤erent
model in which there is no altruism in the family and young agents choose
to allocate their time endowment to work or to human capital investment.
The level e¤ect of borrowing constraints on capital intensity interacts
with fertility and education investment decisions to determine the growth
e¤ect (De Gregorio, 1996; Azariadis and de la Croix, 2005). The rate of
fertility shows clearly two e¤ects of greater 	: a partial positive e¤ect which
is countervailed by the negative e¤ect of 	 on capital intensity. Hence, at a
steady state, greater credit allows parents to spend a higher share of their
life-cycle income on child rearing, but reduces the present value of their
current and future income. Hence, the net e¤ect of greater 	 is ambiguous.
This is also the case of comparative statics of 	 on b which depends on
fertility and capital intensity. We rely on numerical simulations of the model
to characterize the relations between 	 and bn or b. In fact, we specify the
following CRRA utility function of fertility:
U (n) =

1  1

 1
n1 
1
 ,
which under  > 1 satises assumption A2. We specify the parameters by
referring to values common in the existing literature. Hence, we assume that
one period in the evolution of the model economy is fteen years, and the
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yearly discount factor is 1/1.06 which implies that  = 0:417 (see Lochner
and Monge-Naranjo, 2002). Relying on evidence that can be found in the
literature on the cost of raising children (e.g., de la Croix and Doepke, 2004),
we set:  = 0:15. The capital share parameter  assumes the value 0:33
which is the usual choice in the literature. Subsidies to education are found
world-wide and cover a signicant share of the costs. However, human capital
investment also includes several informal learning activities which are not
usually subsidized. Hence, we think that a value of 0:3 for the subsidization
rate v represents a good estimate of the real average value. The government
funds such subsidies to human capital by levying taxes on wages. Since our
model does not consider other forms of public expenditures, and the ratio of
taxes on GDP varies across many countries in a range between 0:3 and 0:5, we
set the rate of income taxes tw equal to 0:2. The rest of the parameters were
chosen to obtain reliable results from simulations. Accordingly, the weight of
child human capital in parentspreferences is set to ' = 0:5, while utility of
the number of children is xed by the parameter  = 1:59. We also calibrated
the model by choosing the scale of production technology: A = 5, while the
scale parameter of investment in education assumes the value  = 10.
The equations (27)-(30) were simulated under the above specied set of
parameter values in order to numerically draw the functions of bk, bn, b, andbg with respect to 	, which varies in the range (0:2  0:9). Figures (2)-(4)
represent such relations10. Figure (2) shows how the number of children re-
sponds positively to less tight credit constraints, although the curve decreases
at high values of 	. This pattern implies that the direct positive e¤ect of 	
on bn overcomes the negative e¤ect due to decreasing labor income which
derives from the negative inuence of greater household credit on capital in-
tensity. The last e¤ect prevails over the direct when 	 is close to 1. Hence,
simulations support a view of the e¤ects of nancial reforms in which fer-
tility and saving take opposite directions. Such a result has a crucial role
in shaping the relation between credit availability and investment in educa-
tion. Indeed, equation (29) shows that b decreases with bn, and increases
with bk. Figure (3) presents a simulated curve with an inverted U shape on
the plane (	; b), which tells of a positive inuence of better access to the
credit market on child education when the market is underdeveloped. In this
type of economy, if young parents are allowed to borrow greater resources
they choose to have more children and to make a greater investment in each
9When ' = 0:5 and  = 1:5, assumption A1 is satised if the gross fertility rate, bn,
takes values greater than 0.45, which is the case in our simulations.
10We performed simulations under di¤erent parameter congurations and the shape of
the simulated relations did not change.
18
childs education (the direct e¤ect of 	). This e¤ect on child quality exceeds
the negative e¤ect which derives from greater fertility and lower labor in-
come. However, the positive e¤ects of greater household credit vanish when
	 reaches a signicant value and the nancial sector becomes well developed.
The rate of growth of aggregate income (Figure 4), which equals the rate of
accumulation of aggregate human capital, L, follows a trend similar to that
of b with greater growth as a consequence of better credit access of house-
holds in the rst stages of nancial development and a limit to the benets
that may be gained by such a policy.
Our results would appear to reconcile the existing econometric evid-
ence on the relation between household borrowing constraints and economic
growth with economic theory. Indeed, Jappelli and Pagano (1994) nd an
increasing relation between the two phenomena in estimates of a model on
a sample of developed countries (OECD and others), and this evidence is
not clearly denied by the results of De Gregorio (1996) from estimates on
a similar sample of countries. On the other hand, De Gregorio (1996) also
nds signicant evidence of a positive e¤ect on growth of the ratio of credit
from the banking system to the nonnancial private sector and GDP, from
estimates on data of 63 developing countries. According to the results of
our model, nancial development can be benecial for economic growth of
poor countries since it boosts investment in human capital, while in developed
countries greater credit availability might bring about lower economic growth
through increased fertility and decreased saving.
The e¤ects of education subsidy and tax changes
The aggregate dynamics of the model economy depend not only on the
degree of nancial development, but also on state intervention toward the
family. The intergenerational distribution policy specied in the present
model is made by subsidies to young parentsexpenditure on childrens edu-
cation and a proportional tax on labor income of the adult generation who
do not have to care for their grown-up children. This simplied tax scheme
could be augmented with other forms of taxes and family benets without
changing the main predictions of the model. The comparative statics of
the steady-state equilibrium relies on equations (27)-(30), and provides the
following
Proposition 3 1. The steady-state capital to labor ratio bk increases if
education subsidies, v, increase and decreases if the rate of income tax,
tw, increases.
2. The steady-state rate of fertility bn increases with education subsidies,
v, and decreases with the rate of income tax, tw.
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Proof. In appendix.
Intuition behind the results of Proposition3 can be gained by considering
that greater subsidies to human capital make education less expensive and
consequently young adults have fewer children and invest more in their hu-
man capital, which in turn increases both lifetime income and savings. Taxes
on adult wages reduce their disposable income and savings. Changes in the
rates v and tw a¤ect the number of children per young adult through income
and substitution e¤ects and the endogenous changes in bk.
Greater subsidies to child quality increase the disposable income but make
the number of children more expensive, with opposite e¤ects on bn. The
positive one is reinforced by that of subsidies on capital intensity which raises
wages per e¢ ciency unit. According to Proposition 3, the net e¤ect of v onbn is positive.
Higher taxes on adult wages decrease the parentsdiscounted lifetime in-
come which implies that they face a tighter credit constraint. Hence, young
parents have less resources for consumption and investment in children. Fur-
thermore, higher taxes reduce adult disposable income and this has a negative
e¤ect on savings. Hence, the negative partial impact of tw on bn is reinforced
by that on the level of human capital and on capital intensity which further
decreases the discounted life-time earnings of the parents. Our results are at
odds with those of Zhang and Casagrande (1998) who develop comparative
statics analysis of a growth model with endogenous fertility and education,
and nd no e¤ect of subsidies and income taxes on the equilibrium rate of
population growth.
Notwithstanding the unambiguous sign of comparative statics e¤ects of
v and tw on bn and bk, those on the rate of human capital accumulation and
the growth rate cannot be determined. Such di¢ culties arise because of the
negative inuence of bn on both b and bg. Indeed, greater subsidies make edu-
cation less expensive and raise capital intensity, but they also raise fertility,
which countervails the former positive e¤ects on the rate of human capital
accumulation. The same situation with opposite sign e¤ects applies to the
total derivative of b with respect to the rate of income taxes. Here, again, we
simulate the model to get insights into the relation between v, tw and b andbg11. Figures 5-8 present the simulation results. Figure 5 shows how greater
income taxes increase investment in human capital at low values of tw, and
then they decrease it. This non-monotonic relation is conrmed in the case
of education subsidies by Figure 7, where b increases with v till it reaches a
maximum and then decreases for high values of the subsidy rate. However,
11In this case, we set 	 = 0:4:
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Figures 6 and 8 present two monotone simulated curves of the growth ratebg as a function of respectively tw and v. Indeed, economic growth decreases
with greater income taxes and increases with higher education subsidies.
Hence, intergenerational scal policy to foster economic growth maintains
the usual e¤ects even in this model with endogenous fertility.
5 Conclusions
This paper presented a dynamic general equilibrium investigation of house-
hold behavior under borrowing constraints in which the number of children
is endogenous. The analysis of the model shows how fertility, education and
savings interact under liquidity constraints, and comparative statics high-
lights non-monotonic e¤ects of nancial reforms on endogenous variables and
growth at the steady state. In order to derive analytical results, it is assumed
that the limit to borrowing is exogenously given. Hence, the results of the
paper can be considered a useful reference for further analysis with endogen-
ous credit constraints. Furthermore, intergenerational public policy provides
some new hinsights into the e¤ects of subsidies to education and income
taxes on economic growth with endogenous fertility. The study of optimal
scal policy in a dynamic general equilibrium with endogenous fertility choice
setup remains a task for future research. Empirical investigation of the issues
of this paper still remain to be done since the existing literature examines
single sides of the behavior of households under liquidity constraints, but
fails to provide a full account of it.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. The di¤erence equations (21) and (22) at a
steady state become:
bj bw = tw
vbj , (A1)bw = A (1  )1  bx bw1 ; (A2)
which jointly provide the following equation:
bx = bj  2(1 ) 1
A

tw
v (1  )
 1 

. (A3)
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Furthermore, at steady state equation (24) can be written as:
bx [+	(1  ) (1  tw)] + bx bwbj =
(A4)
(1 	) (1  ) + 
2 (1 	) (1  )A 
 + 2


[1 + (1  tw) bx]bx bwbj .
Substitution of (A2) and (A3) in (A4) gives:
bj [+	(1  ) (1  tw)]B + bj 1tw
v
B =
bj1 2 (1 	) (1  )Av 
 + 2

tw
B + bj 2 (1 	) (1  ) (1  tw)Av 
 + 2

tw
+ (1 	) (1  ) ;
where
   2 (1  )

< 0; and B  1
A

tw
v (1  )
 1 

> 0:
It can be easily seen that this equation in bj has on the left side, l(bj), a
decreasing convex function with:
limbj!0l(bj) =1; and limbj!1l(bj) = 0:
The right side, r(bj), is an increasing concave function with:
limbj!0r(bj) = (1 	) (1  ) ; and limbj!1r(bj) =1;
hence the left side crosses the right side only at one positive value of bj.
Derivation of equations (27)-(30) Let us consider (21) at the steady
state in which we substitute the denition of jt, eq. (18), bw = A (1  )bk,
and bx = (A) 1 bk1 , then the following implicit equation for bn derives:
Un (bn) bn = 	'
1  v
s
(1  ) vA
tw

1 +
(1  tw)
A
bk1 bk 2   1.
Applying the same substitutions to equation (19) we get the rate of human
capital accumulation:
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b = 	'
1  v

A (1  )bk + (1  tw) 1  bk
[Un (bn) bn+ 1] bn ,
which immediately gives the gross rate of growth of aggregate income:
bg + 1 = 	'
1  v

A (1  )bk + (1  tw) 1  bk
[Un (bn) bn+ 1] .
In the steady state, the equation (24) - which derives from equilibrium in
the capital market - can be written in implicit form as:
bx [+	(1  ) (1  tw)] + bx bwbj   (1 	) (1  )+
(A5)
 
2 (1 	) (1  )A 
 + 2


[1 + (1  tw) bx]bx bwbj = 0.
Equation (21) at steady state can be written as
bj = bk 2s tw
Av (1  ) ;
which, with bx = (A) 1 bk1  and bx bw = 1 

bk - derived from the denition
of bx - provide:
bx bwbj = 1  

s
tw
Av (1  )
bk1 2 . (A6)
From substitution of (A6) in (A5) we get:

bk  B1bk1 +B2bk1 2  B3 hbk 2 1 + (1  tw)bk 2 i  (1 	) (1  ) = 0
where B1, B2, B3 are parameters:
B1  +	(1  ) (1  tw)
A
; B2  (1  )
1
2 
3
2
r
tw
Av
;
B3  
2 (1 	)pv (1  )A 
 + 2


3
2
p
tw
:
Proof of Proposition 3.
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1) Applying the implicit function theorem to equation (30) we get:
@bk
@a
=
 a
bk; v
bk
bk; v , a = v; tw.
From the proof of Proposition 2 we know bk
bk; a > 0. The derivative
v
bk; v < 0 is straight, and dbk=dv > 0 follows. Deriving equation (30)
with respect to tw we obtain:
tw
bk; tw =  	(1  )
A
bk1  + 0:5
tw
B2bk1 2 + 0:5
tw
B3
hbk 2 1 + (1  tw)bk 2 i+
+B3bk 2 .
This derivative is positive if the technology parameter A is high enough,
which can be assumed without maior consequences. This result completes
the proof of the rst part of the proposition.
2) Since A2 implies that Un (bn) bn is an increasing function of bn, the sign
of the e¤ects of v and tw on fertility derives from total di¤erentiation:
d [Un (bn) bn]
da
=
@ [Un (bn) bn]
@a
+
@ [Un (bn) bn]
@bk dbkda , a = v; tw.
The partial derivative of Un (bn) bn with respect to v is clearly positive, as are
the other two derivatives, which mean that dbn=dv > 0. Similarly, we have:
@ [Un (bn) bn]
@tw
< 0;
dbk
dtw
< 0,
from which we get dbn=dtw < 0.
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Figure 1: Eigenvalues of the dynamic system for 100 parameter congurations.
Figure 2: Fertility rate as a function of the relaxation of borrowing constraints.
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Figure 3: Growth rate of human capital as a function of the relaxation of borrow-
ing constraints.
Figure 4: Economy growth rate as a function of the relaxation of borrowing
constraints.
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Figure 5: Growth rate of human capital as a function of income tax rate.
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
t
g
Figure 6: Economy growth rate as a function of income tax rate.
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Figure 7: Growth rate of human capital as a function of the subsidy rate.
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Figure 8: Economy growth rate as a function of education subsidy
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